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1 All leading cause of death data and state rankings calculated by the Violence Policy Center using
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s WISQARS (Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting
System) database (http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html). 
2 Race and ethnicity are two separate designations.  To calculate Hispanic ethnicity, for all races
Hispanic ethnicity was excluded from race data (e.g., white non-Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, etc.).  For the
purposes of this study, these definitions will be presented without the modifying descriptions “non-Hispanic” and all
races and ethnicity will be referred to as race.  
Introduction:  Historical Data and the Effects of Violence
Homicide is the second leading cause of death for California youth and young adults ages 10 to 24
years old.
In 2010, the most recent year for which complete data is available from the federal Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), homicides in California were outpaced only by unintentional
injuries—the majority of which were motor vehicle fatalities—as the leading cause of death for this
age group.  Of the nearly 700 homicides reported, 85 percent were committed with firearms.
Nationally in 2010, California had the 14th highest homicide rate for youth and young adults ages
10 to 24.1   (Please see Appendix One for a chart ranking the states by homicide rate for this age
group for the year 2010.) 
Broken out by gender, homicide retains its number two ranking for males and drops to number four
for females for this age group in California.  For males, of the 613 homicides reported, firearms were
the weapon used in 88 percent of the killings.  For females, of the 77 homicides reported, firearms
were the weapon used in 61 percent of the killings.    
When analyzed by race and ethnicity, however, the rankings become less uniform and the severe
effects of homicide on specific segments of this age group increasingly stark.2  For blacks ages 10
to 24 in California in 2010, homicide was the leading cause of death.  For Hispanics it was the
second leading cause of death.  For American Indian and Alaska Natives it was the third leading
cause of death.  For whites and Asian/Pacific Islanders it was the fourth leading cause of death.    
2010 Leading Causes of Death in California, Both Sexes Ages 10 to 24, by Race
Hispanic Black White Asian/PacificIslander
American Indian/
Alaska Native
1 UnintentionalInjury Homicide
Unintentional
Injury
Unintentional
Injury
Unintentional
Injury
2 Homicide UnintentionalInjury Suicide Suicide Suicide
3 Suicide Suicide MalignantNeoplasms
Malignant
Neoplasms Homicide
4 MalignantNeoplasms
Malignant
Neoplasms Homicide Homicide Heart Disease
3 Per capita homicide rates for specific races ages 10 to 24 years old determined by the Violence
Policy Center using the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s WISQARS (Web-Based Injury Statistics
Query and Reporting System) database (http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html). 
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As detailed in the graph above, from 2000 through 2010 the homicide rate among black youth and
young adults ages 10 to 24 in California was far higher than the overall California homicide rate
among the same age group.3   The rate for Hispanic youth in California was also consistently above
the state’s overall rate for this age group, while the rates for Asian and white youth were well below
the state’s overall rate.  The rates for American Indian and Alaska Natives are not included because
the National Center for Health Statistics suppresses data if fewer than 10 deaths are reported for a
given population.  A chart containing the supporting data for this graph follows.
Homicide Rates in California, Ages 10 to 24, 2000 to 2010
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4 A 2011 study published in The Journal of Trauma—Injury, Infection, and Critical Care compared
firearm deaths for a slightly different age group, youth and young adults ages 15 to 24, in 23 high-income countries
in 2003:  “The U.S. age group at greatest relative risk of homicide is the 15 year olds to 24 year olds, and compared
with young people in these other high-income nations, U.S. youth have a firearm homicide rate 42 times higher, and
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However, in the five-year period from 2006 through 2010, the homicide rate for this age group
declined from a high of 12.75 per 100,000 in 2006 to 8.43 per 100,000 in 2010—a decrease of 34
percent.  Similar declines were seen in the most severely affected segments of this population group.
For blacks, the homicide rate dropped from 50.44 per 100,000 to 39.55 per 100,000, a decrease of
22 percent.  For Hispanics, the homicide rate dropped from 15.76 per 100,000 to 9.64 per 100,000,
a decrease of 39 percent.  For whites, the homicide rate dropped from 3.30 per 100,000 to 2.10 per
100,000, a decrease of 36 percent.  And for Asian/Pacific Islanders, the homicide rate dropped from
6.29 per 100,000 to 3.12 per 100,000, a decrease of 50 percent.
California Homicide Rates for Victims Ages 10 to 24 by Race, 
2000 to 2010 (All Rates per 100,000 for Relevant Population)
Year Hispanic Black White
Asian/
Pacific 
Islander
Overall
2000 13.55 41.35 2.83 4.22 10.33
2001 14.16 42.05 3.35 5.59 11.03
2002 14.47 47.49 3.36 5.33 11.65
2003 14.80 47.17 3.23 5.54 11.77
2004 14.99 49.47 3.48 4.44 12.02
2005 14.53 49.42 2.93 6.03 11.85
2006 15.76 50.44 3.30 6.29 12.75
2007 14.27 45.02 2.25 4.42 11.14
2008 12.92 39.21 2.40 4.27 10.16
2009 12.00 39.54 2.29 3.34 9.67
2010 9.64 39.55 2.10 3.12 8.43
Compared to other nations, youth and young adults in the United States have far higher firearm
homicide rates.4  And often left unstated is the fact that the effects of violence extend far beyond the
an overall homicide rate more than 14 times higher.  Both young men and young women aged 15 to 24 are at higher
risk:  young men are being killed with firearms at more than 46 times the rate of young men in these other countries,
and females at more than 23 times the rate.”   Richardson, Erin G., S.M., Hemenway, David, Ph.D., “Homicide,
Suicide, and Unintentional Firearm Fatality:  Comparing the United States With Other High-Income Countries,
2003,” Journal of Trauma—Injury, Infection & Critical Care, January 2011, Volume 70, Issue 1, pp 238-243.
5 A 2007 article published in the San Francisco Chronicle detailing the lives of children living in an
“urban war zone” in the city noted:  “The violence, layers of it overlapping year after year, can eventually take up
residence in the children's minds.  Like combat veterans, they develop post-traumatic stress disorder—the soldier's
sickness.  As many as one-third of children living in our country's violent urban neighborhoods have PTSD,
according to recent research and the country's top child trauma experts—nearly twice the rate reported for troops
returning from war zones in Iraq.”  “Hidden Victims of Violence,” San Francisco Chronicle, August 26, 2007.
6  One 1987 study examined 159 children attending a Los Angeles school that had been attacked by a
sniper:  “They found that one month after the attack more than half of the children showed symptoms of PTSD.  At a
fourteen month follow-up, those children who were not directly exposed to the shooting showed diminished
symptoms, while those children who had been near the shooting or had known one of the victims continued to show
severe symptoms.  They found that factors which increase the likelihood of PTSD in childhood witnesses of violence
include:  being physically close to the violence, knowing the victim, and previous exposure to violence.”  Duncan,
David F., Dr.P.H., “Growing Up Under the Gun:  Children and Adolescents Coping with Violent Neighborhoods,”
The Journal of Primary Prevention, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1996.
7    Duncan, David F., Dr.P.H., “Growing Up Under the Gun:  Children and Adolescents Coping with
Violent Neighborhoods,” The Journal of Primary Prevention, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1996.
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flesh and blood toll measured in homicides and non-fatal injuries.  An additional heavy price is
exacted on family members and entire communities:  the psychological stress of living with such
violence can manifest itself as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that can often last a lifetime.5
According to the National Center for PTSD at the United States Department of Veterans Affairs, 77
percent of children who witness a school shooting develop PTSD and nearly 100 percent of  children
who witness a parent being killed suffer from PTSD.  More than a third of children who see violence
in the area where they live get PTSD.
Decades of research confirm that children and adolescents who witness shootings are susceptible to
prolonged trauma.6  Moreover, “...the effects of repeated exposures to violence are additive, with
each exposure tending to exacerbate or renew symptoms caused by earlier exposures. Chronic
trauma, such as that associated with living in a violent neighborhood, can product particularly severe
reactions.”7
Nationally, children’s exposure to shootings rises sharply in both past-year and lifetime incidence
from one age group to the next.  The federal National Survey of Children’s Exposure to Violence
(NatSCEV), conducted between January and May 2008, found that while 1.1 percent of children
younger than two years old were exposed to shootings in the past year, 10.2 percent of 14- to 17-year
olds had witnessed a shooting in the past year.  Looking at children who had witnessed a shooting
during their lifetimes, while 3.5 percent of two- to five-year-olds had witnessed a shooting during
8    Finkelhor, David, et al, “Children’s Exposure to Violence:  A Comprehensive National Survey,”
Juvenile Justice Bulletin, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Office of Justice Programs, U.S.
Department of Justice, October 2009.
9  “The Social Costs of Handgun Violence,” Testimony of Jens Ludwig, Ph.D., before the Chicago
City Council, June 29, 2010.
10  Heaton, Paul, “Hidden in Plain Sight:  What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell Us About Investing
in Police,” RAND Corporation, 2010 (http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP279). 
11  Gun Violence in America:  One Week, Six Cities, and the Implications, Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF), April 2012 (http://policeforum.org/library/crime/PERFPresentationonGunViolence.pdf).
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their lifetimes, for 14- to 17-year-olds the percentage rose to 22.2 percent.8 
In addition to the physical and emotional toll, there are also financial costs associated with gun
violence that affect communities, costs that are widely shared among a “...city’s residents but
disproportionately so by the most economically vulnerable among us.”9   
A 2012 study by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) looked at the cost of gun violence
citing 2010 data from The Rand Corporation,10 which “provides the most recent cost-of-crime
estimates, averaged from 3 high-quality studies using different methodology.”  According to the
PERF study, the “most conservative estimates used by RAND were produced by Cohen & Piquero
(2009)” who estimated the following costs per crime:  murder, five million dollars; armed robbery
$50,000; aggravated assault, $55,000; unlawful possession, $500; and, “other” gun related-related
crimes, $500.  Costs that were included in the estimates included: 
#  Victim Costs (lost productivity, medical care, social services, property loss, and a
“quality of life” estimate);
#  Criminal Justice Costs (costs per offender of each stage of the process, including  
police costs, prosecutor costs, court costs, and costs of prison, jail, and probation and
parole agencies);
#  Offender Costs (medical care, costs borne by offenders’ families, and loss of any
legitimate earnings of offenders prior to incarceration).
One of the six cities studied was San Diego (the remaining five were Austin, Milwaukee,
Minneapolis, Philadelphia, and Toronto).  The PERF study estimated that the total cost for gun crime
in San Diego for the single week of April 4 to 10, 2011, was $807,500:  aggravated assaults, 11 times
$55,000 for a total of $605,000; armed robberies, four times $50,000 for a total of $200,000;
unlawful possessions, five times $500 for a total of $2,500.  For all six cities, “one week of gun
crime generated a price tag of $38.57 million.11 
6Data contained in the PERF study estimated the costs of firearm crime in 2010 at $57,926,815,000:
gun homicide, 8,775 incidents times $5,000,000 per incident for a total of $43,875,000,000; armed
robbery, 128,793 incidents times $50,000 per incident for a total of $6,439,650,000; and, aggravated
assault, 138,403 incidents times $55,000 per incident for a total of $7,612,165,000.  
This is the third consecutive year that the Violence Policy Center has published Lost Youth and it
is our intent to continue to publish this information annually.  The primary goal of this series of
reports is to offer localized information on the county level in California to better inform citizens,
advocates, service providers, and policymakers.  
This latest edition of Lost Youth includes a new section that begins with an assessment of  the known
impact of “tough on crime” policies (the all-too-frequent default response to violence in general, and
youth violence in particular), reviews current national and California-specific prevention-focused
violence-reduction efforts, and concludes by highlighting three local California programs that have
demonstrated success: Second Chance Family and Youth Services in Salinas; Youth Alive! in
Oakland; and, the Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program (GRYD) in Los Angeles.
All too often, the devastating effects of violence are little recognized outside of those who are
directly affected.  By comparing on a county-by-county level the homicide rates for youth and young
adults in California, it is our goal to add a new, ongoing context for information to be presented
while helping support discussion, analysis, policy development, and action.  Above all, this work is
conducted in the belief that information aids in the development of sound prevention strategies—on
the local, state, and national levels.   
7Section One:  2011 California County-by-County Data
This study offers both statewide and county-by-county homicide statistics for youth and young adults
ages 10 to 24 utilizing 2011 California Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) data (this is the most
recent California homicide data available and is separate from the historical data cited in the prior
section) and 2011 census data.  To help ensure more stable rates, only counties with a population of
at least 25,000 10- to 24-year-olds are included.  The selected counties account for 98 percent of
homicide victims ages 10 to 24 in California (631 out of 641 victims) and 98 percent of California’s
population ages 10 to 24 (8,014,360 out of 8,188,043) for 2011. 
It is important to note that the coding contained in the California Supplementary Homicide Report
data used in this report comes from law enforcement reporting at the local level.  While there are
coding guidelines followed by the law enforcement agencies, the level of information submitted to
the SHR system, and the interpretation that results in the information submitted (for example, gang
involvement) will vary from county to county.  While this study utilizes the best and most recent
state data available, it is limited by the degree of detail in the information submitted.   
County Rankings
Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 by California County in 2011, Ranked by Rate 
Ranking County Number ofHomicides
Population, Ages
10 to 24
Homicide Rate
per 100,000
1 San Joaquin County 35 164,391 21.29
2 San Francisco County 21 116,400 18.04
3 Monterey County 16 94,328 16.96
4 Alameda County 50 297,222 16.82
5 Contra Costa County 31 210,356 14.74
6 Solano County 12 87,540 13.71
7 Tulare County 15 111,674 13.43
8 Stanislaus County 12 120,963 9.92
9 Los Angeles County 207 2,166,791 9.55
10 Santa Cruz County 6 63,850 9.40
In 2011, the homicide rate among victims 10 to 24 years old in California was 7.87 per 100,000. 
In 2011, San Joaquin County ranked first as the county with the highest homicide rate among victims
8ages 10 to 24.  Its rate of 21.29 per 100,000 was nearly three times the statewide rate.  San Joaquin
County was followed by San Francisco County (18.04 per 100,000), Monterey County (16.96 per
100,000), Alameda County (16.82 per 100,000), and Contra Costa County (14.74 per 100,000).  The
remaining counties that comprise the top 10 are detailed in the chart on the previous page.   
A chart listing the number and rate of homicide victims 10 to 24 years old by county and ranking
each county by its homicide rate for this age group can be found in Appendix Two.  
An alphabetical listing by county with identical information can be found in Appendix Three.  
An alphabetical listing by county with data comparing 2009, 2010, and 2011 can be found in
Appendix Four.  
Additional 2011 data for the top 10 counties—gender and race of victim, type of weapon used,
relationship of victim to offender, circumstances of the homicide, and location where the homicide
took place—can be found in Appendix Five.  
General statewide findings are summarized below. 
Gender and Race of Homicide Victims 
Out of the 631 homicide victims ages 10 to 24 in California in 2011, 577 were male (91 percent) and
54 were female (nine percent).  For homicides in which the race of the victim was identified (629
victims):  343 were Hispanic (55 percent); 201 were black (32 percent); 51 were white (eight
percent); 32 were Asian (five percent); and two were “other” (less than one percent).  Overall,
Hispanic victims were killed at a rate (8.85 per 100,000) more than four times higher than white
victims (2.15 per 100,000).  Black victims were killed at a rate (39.79 per 100,000) more than 18
times higher than white victims (2.15 per 100,000).  Asian victims were killed at roughly one and
a half times the rate of white victims (3.49 per 100,000  compared to 2.15 per 100,000).
Race and Gender of California Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24, 2011
Male Percent Female Percent Total
Hispanic 322 94% 21 6% 343
Black 184 92% 17 9% 201
White 39 77% 12 24% 51
Asian 30 94% 2 6% 32
Overall 577 91% 54 9% 631
12 Information on gang activity is provided in two sections of the SHR data and is dependent on how
local jurisdictions define and record such data.  Although relationships are defined as victim to offender, because of
potential inconsistencies in on-scene reporting a relationship may be coded as “gang member” if the victim of the
homicide or the offender is believed to be a gang member.  In the circumstance field, it may be coded as “gangland
killing” or “gang killing” if the homicide is believed to be related to gang activity, whether or not the victim is a gang
member.
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California Homicide Rates for Victims Ages 10 to 24 by Race and Gender, 
2011 (All Rates per 100,000 for Relevant Population)
Male Female Overall
Hispanic 16.11 1.12 8.85
Black 70.85 6.93 39.79
White 3.17 1.05 2.15
Asian 6.40 0.45 3.49
Victim to Offender Relationship
Among youth and young adults in 2011, for homicides in which the victim to offender relationship
could be identified, 54 percent (172 out of 316) were killed by a stranger.  Thirty-one percent (97
out of 316) were killed by someone they knew.  Forty-seven additional victims (15 percent) were
identified as gang members.12
For this age group,  black and Hispanic victims were more likely to be killed by a stranger than white
or Asian victims.  Sixty percent of all black victims were killed by a stranger (50 out of 83).  Twenty-
nine percent of black victims (24 out of 83) were murdered by someone they knew.  Nine additional
victims (11 percent) were identified as gang members.  Fifty-nine percent of Hispanic victims were
killed by strangers (106 out of 180).  Twenty-three percent of Hispanic victims (42 out of 180) were
murdered by someone they know.  An additional 18 percent of Hispanic victims (32 out of 180) were
identified as gang members.
In comparison, 59 percent of white victims were murdered by someone they knew (19 out of 32) and
28 percent (nine out of 32) were killed by a stranger.  An additional 13 percent of white victims (four
out of 32) were identified as gang members.  Fifty-five percent of Asian victims (11 out of 20) were
murdered by someone they knew and 35 percent (seven out of 20) were killed by strangers.  An
additional 10 percent of Asian victims (two out of 20) were identified as gang members.  
Most Common Weapons
Firearms—especially handguns—were the most common weapon used to murder youth and young
adults in 2011.  Of the 625 homicides for which the murder weapon could be identified, 83 percent
13 Information on gang activity is provided in two sections of the SHR data and is dependant on how
local jurisdictions define and record such data.  Although relationships are defined as victim to offender, because of
potential inconsistencies in on-scene reporting a relationship may be coded as “gang member” if the victim of the
homicide or the offender is believed to be a gang member.  In the circumstance field, it may be coded as “gangland
killing” or “gang killing” if the homicide is believed to be related to gang activity, whether or not the victim is a gang
10
of victims (520 out of 625) died by gunfire.  Of these, 73 percent (382 out of 520) were killed with
a handgun.
Use of Guns and Handguns in Homicides of Californians, Ages 10 to 24 by Race, 2011
Number of
Gun
Homicides
Gun Homicides
as Percentage of
All Homicides
Number of
Handgun
Homicides
Handgun Homicides
as Percentage of All
Gun Homicides
Hispanic 283 83% 217 77%
Black 180 90% 128 71%
White 34 68% 17 50%
Asian 21 70% 19 90%
Overall 520 83% 382 73%
Use of Guns and Handguns in Homicides of Californians, Ages 10 to 24 by Race, 
2009, 2010, and 2011
Number of Gun
Homicides
Gun Homicides as
Percentage of All
Homicides
Number of Handgun
Homicides
Handgun Homicides as
Percentage of All Gun
Homicides
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Hispanic 370 315 283 84% 88% 83% 283 233 217 76% 74% 77%
Black 215 216 180 90% 93% 90% 169 172 128 79% 80% 71%
White 54 27 34 70% 61% 68% 34 18 17 63% 67% 50%
Asian 22 15 21 88% 65% 70% 16 10 19 73% 67% 90%
Overall 670 581 520 84% 87% 83% 510 439 382 76% 76% 73%
Circumstance 
The overwhelming majority of homicides of youth and young adults in 2011 were not related to any
other felony crime.  For the 445 homicides in which the circumstances between the victim and
offender could be identified, 81 percent (362 out of 445) were not related to the commission of any
other felony.  Of these, 61 percent (222 of 362) were gang-related.13  
member.
11
For all races, the majority of deaths were not related to the commission of any other felony.  
For Hispanic victims, 84 percent (220 out of 261) were not related to the commission of any other
felony.  Of these, 66 percent (146 out of 220) were gang-related.  
For black victims, 80 percent (96 out of 120) were not related to the commission of any other felony.
Of these, 58 percent (56 out of 96) were gang-related.  
For white victims, 73 percent (27 out of 37) were not related to the commission of any other felony.
Of these, 37 percent (10 out of 27) were gang-related.  
 For Asian victims, 69 percent (18 out of 26) were not related to the commission of any other felony.
Of these, 56 percent (10 out of 18) were gang-related.  
 
Location
In 2011, among youth and young adults for homicides in which the location could be determined,
55 percent (344 out of 620) occurred on a street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Twelve percent (75
out of 620) occurred in the home of the victim or offender.  Thirteen percent (82 out of 620) occurred
at another residence, and six percent (40 out of 620) occurred in a vehicle.
For all races, the most common homicide location was a street, sidewalk, or parking lot.  For
homicides in which the location could be determined, 60 percent of black victims (118 out of 198),
57 percent of Hispanic victims (194 out of 340), 41 percent of Asian victims (13 out of 32), and 38
percent of white victims (18 out of 48) were killed in one of these locations.  
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 31 percent of Asian victims (10 out of 32),
15 percent of white victims (seven out of 48), 11 percent of Hispanic victims (38 out of 340), and
10 percent of black victims (20 out of 198) were killed in the home of the victim or the offender. 
Twenty-nine percent of white victims (14 out of 48), 16 percent of Asian victims (five out of 32),
12 percent of Hispanic victims (40 out of 340), and 11 percent of black victims (22 out of 198) were
killed at another residence.  
Seven percent of black victims (14 out of 198), six percent of white victims (three out of 48), six
percent of Hispanic victims (21 out of 340), and six percent of Asian victims (two out of 32) were
killed in a vehicle.       
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Section Two:  Hispanic Victims
In 2011, Hispanic youth and young adults were murdered at a rate more than four times higher than
white youth and young adults:  8.85 per 100,000 compared to 2.15 per 100,000.  While Hispanic
youth and young adults comprised 48 percent of California’s population between the ages of 10 and
24, they accounted for 54 percent of the homicide victims in the same age group.
Gender of Hispanic Homicide Victims 
Of the 343 Hispanic homicide victims age 10 to 24 in California in 2011, 322 were male (94 percent)
and 21 were female (six percent).
Victim to Offender Relationship
Among Hispanic youth and young adults in 2011, for homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 23 percent of victims (42 out of 180) were murdered by someone
they knew.  One hundred and six victims were killed by strangers.  For homicides in which the
victim to offender relationship could be identified, 18 percent of the victims (32 out of 180) were
gang members.
Hispanic Homicide Victims and Weapons
As with youth and young adult homicide victims in general, firearms—especially handguns—were
the most common weapons used to murder Hispanic youth and young adults in 2011.  In the 342
homicides for which the murder weapon could be identified, 83 percent of Hispanic victims (283
victims) were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 77 percent (217 victims) were killed with a
handgun. 
Hispanic Homicide Victims and Circumstance 
The overwhelming majority of homicides of Hispanic youth and young adults in 2011 were not
related to any other felony crime.  For the 261 homicides in which the circumstances between the
victim and offender could be identified, 84 percent (220 out of 261) were not related to the
commission of any other felony.  Of these, 66 percent (146 out of 220) were gang-related.  
Hispanic Homicide Victims and Location
In 2011, among Hispanic youth and young adults, for homicides in which the location could be
determined, 57 percent (194 out of 340) occurred on a street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Eleven
percent (38 out of 340) occurred in the home of the victim or offender.  Twelve percent (40 out of
340) occurred at another residence, and six percent (21 out of 340) occurred in a vehicle.
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Section Three:  Black Victims
In 2011, black youth and young adults were murdered at a rate more than 18 times higher than white
youth and young adults:  39.79 per 100,000 compared to 2.15 per 100,000.  While black youth and
young adults comprised six percent of California’s population between the ages of 10 and 24, they
accounted for 32 percent of the homicide victims in the same age group.
Gender of Black Homicide Victims 
Of the 201 black homicide victims age 10 to 24 in California in 2011, 184 were male (92 percent)
and 17 were female (nine percent).
Victim to Offender Relationship
Among black youth and young adults in 2011, for homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 29 percent of victims (24 out of 83) were murdered by someone they
knew.  Fifty victims were killed by strangers.  For homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 11 percent (nine out of 83) of the victims were gang members.
Black Homicide Victims and Weapons
As with youth and young adult homicide victims in general, firearms—especially handguns—were
the most common weapons used to murder black youth and young adults in 2011.  In the 199
homicides for which the murder weapon could be identified, 90 percent of black victims (180
victims) were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 71 percent (128 victims) were killed with a
handgun.
Black Homicide Victims and Circumstance 
The overwhelming majority of homicides of black youth and young adults in 2011 were not related
to any other felony crime.  For the 120 homicides in which the circumstances between the victim and
offender could be identified, 80 percent (96 out of 120) were not related to the commission of any
other felony.  Of these, 58 percent (56 out of 96) were gang-related.  
Black Homicide Victims and Location
In 2011, among black youth and young adults, for homicides in which the location could be
determined, 60 percent (118 out of 198) occurred on a street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Ten
percent (20 out of 198) occurred in the home of the victim or offender.  Eleven percent (22 out of
198) occurred at another residence, and seven percent (14 out of 198) occurred in a vehicle.
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Section Four:  White Victims
In 2011, white youth and young adults were murdered at a rate of 2.15 per 100,000.  While white
youth and young adults comprised 30 percent of California’s population between the ages of 10 and
24, they accounted for eight percent of the homicide victims in the same age group.
Gender of White Homicide Victims 
Of the 51 white homicide victims age 10 to 24 in California in 2011, 39 were male (77 percent) and
12 were female (24 percent).
Victim to Offender Relationship
Among white youth and young adults in 2011, for homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 59 percent of victims (19 out of 32) were murdered by someone they
knew.  Nine victims were killed by strangers.  For homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 13 percent (four out of 32) of the victims were gang members.
White Homicide Victims and Weapons
As with youth and young adult homicide victims in general, firearms—especially handguns—were
the most common weapons used to murder white youth and young adults in 2011.  In the 50
homicides for which the murder weapon could be identified, 68 percent of white victims (34 victims)
were shot and killed with guns.   Of these, 50 percent (17 victims) were killed with a handgun.
White Homicide Victims and Circumstance 
The majority of homicides of white youth and young adults in 2011 were not related to any other
felony crime.  For the 37 homicides in which the circumstances between the victim and offender
could be identified, 73 percent (27 out of 37) were not related to the commission of any other felony.
Of these, 37 percent (10 of 27) were gang-related.  
White Homicide Victims and Location
In 2011, among white youth and young adults, for homicides in which the location could be
determined, 38 percent (18 out of 48) occurred on a street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Fifteen
percent (seven out of 48) occurred in the home of the victim or offender.  Twenty-nine percent (14
out of 48) occurred at another residence, and six percent (three out of 48) occurred in a vehicle.
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Section Five:  Asian Victims
In 2011, Asian youth and young adults were murdered at roughly one and a half times the rate of
white youth and young adults:  3.49 per 100,000  compared to 2.15 per 100,000.  While Asian youth
and young adults comprised 11 percent of California’s population between the ages of 10 and 24,
they accounted for five percent of the homicide victims in the same age group.
Gender of Asian Homicide Victims 
Of the 32 Asian homicide victims age 10 to 24 in California in 2011, 30 were male (94 percent) and
two were female (six percent).
Victim to Offender Relationship
Among Asian youth and young adults in 2011, for homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 55 percent of victims (11 out of 20) were murdered by someone they
knew.  Seven victims were killed by strangers.  For homicides in which the victim to offender
relationship could be identified, 10 percent (two out of 20) of the victims were gang members. 
Asian Homicide Victims and Weapons
As with youth and young adult homicide victims in general, firearms—especially handguns—were
the most common weapons used to murder Asian youth and young adults in 2011.  In the 30
homicides for which the murder weapon could be identified, 70 percent of Asian victims (21
victims) were shot and killed with guns.   Of these, 90 percent (19 victims) were killed with a
handgun.
Asian Homicide Victims and Circumstance 
The majority of homicides of Asian youth and young adults in 2011 were not related to any other
felony crime.  For the 26 homicides in which the circumstances between the victim and offender
could be identified, 69 percent (18 out of 26) were not related to the commission of any other felony.
Of these, 56 percent (10 out of 18) were gang-related.  
Asian Homicide Victims and Location
In 2011, among Asian youth and young adults, for homicides in which the location could be
determined, 41 percent (13 out of 32) occurred on a street, sidewalk, or in a  parking lot.  Thirty-one
percent (10 out of 32) occurred in the home of the victim or offender.  Sixteen percent (five out of
32) occurred at another residence, and six percent (two out of 32) occurred in a vehicle.
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Section Six:  What Works in Stopping Youth Violence  
Trends nationwide continue to show overall drops in both violent crime14 and violent crime 
victimization rates for adults and juveniles as well as stabilizing rates of gang activity.15 16 17 18  
 
However, a closer inspection of crime trends at the local level reveals that some of the country’s 
largest cities are not experiencing the same reductions in crime rates as the rest of the nation.  In 
some cities, juvenile crime and gang activity have actually increased.  According to findings 
from the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Youth Gang Survey, which examined trends 
between 1996 and 2010, gang-related homicides are up more than 10 percent from 2009 in cities 
with populations greater than 100,000.  The authors of the report note, “Larger cities consistently 
reported greater rates of gang presence and seriousness of gang crime during the 15-year 
period.”19  Some of California’s cities and counties are among those that have seen increases in 
youth violence.  Despite a statewide downward trend of overall juvenile crime (as measured by 
juvenile arrests) between 1999 and 2009, many California municipalities experienced an increase 
in juvenile arrests for violent crime.20  For example, Oakland experienced an increase of more 
than 100 percent of juvenile total, felony, violent, and misdemeanor arrests in the five-year 
period ending in 2009.21 
 
Historically, such statistics have evoked a “tough on crime” response—resulting in sweeping 
legislative reforms across the country, including California.  The typical response has been to 
increase the severity and duration of punishment for youthful offenders through suppression and 
																																																								
14  In the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, violent crime is composed of four 
offenses:  murder and non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; robbery; and, aggravated assault.  Violent crimes 
are defined in the UCR Program as those offenses which involve force or threat of force.	
 
15  Crime in the United States, 2010, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2011 
(http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10tbl01a.xls). 
 
16  Truman, Jennifer L., Criminal Victimization, 2010, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011 (http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2224). 
	
17  OJJDP Statistical Briefing Book, December 17, 2012 (http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ 
crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201). 
	
18  Egley, Arlen, Jr., and Howell, James C., Highlights of the 2010 National Youth Gang Survey, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile 
Justice Fact Sheet, April 2012 (http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/About/Surveys-and-Analyses). 
	
19  Egley, Arlen, Jr., and Howell, James C., Highlights of the 2010 National Youth Gang Survey, U.S. 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Juvenile 
Justice Fact Sheet, 2012 (http://www.nationalgangcenter.gov/About/Surveys-and-Analyses). 
	
20  Juvenile Arrests in California, 1999-2009:  Statewide and local rates and trends, Governor’s 
Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy, State of California, 2010 (www.calgrip.ca.gov/index.cfm?navid=176).	
 
21  Juvenile Arrests in California, 1999-2009:  Statewide and local rates and trends, Governor’s 
Office of Gang and Youth Violence Policy, State of California, 2010  (www.calgrip.ca.gov/index.cfm?navid=176).	
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sanctions-based measures.  This section of the study will begin with an assessment of the known 
impact of  “tough on crime” policies, review current national and California-specific prevention-
focused violence-reduction efforts, and conclude by highlighting three local California programs 
that have demonstrated success. 
 
 
Why Not Suppression? 
In the 1990s, legislative reforms sought to fundamentally change how law enforcement 
approached juvenile delinquency.  A shift, favoring punishment over rehabilitation, began to take 
hold.  These policy shifts are often referred to collectively as the “adultification” of youthful 
offenders because of their resemblance to punitive measures typically reserved for adults.  These 
include efforts to:  transfer more juveniles into adult criminal court; extend “three-strikes” laws 
to juvenile offenders; and, expand the criteria for what can be considered “gang activity.”  
However, a growing body of research reveals that the inclination to toughen treatment of young 
people involved in juvenile corrections has not yielded the desired outcomes of reduced 
delinquency and decreased gang affiliation.  Indeed, mounting evidence demonstrates that these 
policies have, in fact, generated a range of adverse effects.  
 
From an economic perspective, these policies have had a “net widening” effect and have driven 
up juvenile incarceration rates—despite corresponding drops in the juvenile population and 
overall juvenile crime—creating an enormous and unsustainable financial burden.  While one 
may be tempted to conclude that the increase in incarceration has led to the drop in crime, The 
Annie E. Casey Foundation report No Place for Kids:  The Case for Reducing Juvenile 
Incarceration found no correlation between violent youth crime and juvenile confinement rates 
at the state level.  The 2011 report found, “States which lowered juvenile confinement rates the 
most from 1997 to 2007 saw a greater decline in juvenile violent crime arrests than states which 
increased incarceration rates or reduced them more slowly.”22  Nationally, the average annual 
cost of incarcerating a juvenile ranges from $32,000 to $65,000.23  As a result of “net-widening” 
policies, more youth are funneled into the juvenile justice system, which derails their education, 
separates youth from family, and aggravates existing mental health and substance abuse issues.24  
Such policies have also had a disproportionate impact on youth and communities of color, where 
black and Latino youth are significantly more likely to absorb the negative impacts of these 
																																																								
22  No Place for Kids:  The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, press release, The Annie E. 
Casey Foundation, 2011 (http://www.aecf.org/OurWork/JuvenileJustice/~/media/Pubs/Topics/Juvenile% 
20Justice/Detention%20Reform/NoPlaceForKids/JJ_newsRelease_1042011_2.pdf). 
	
23  The Dangers of Detention:  The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure 
Facilities, Barry Holman and Jason Zeidenberg, Justice Policy Institute, 2006 (http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
research/1978). 
 
24  Smart on Crime:  Recommendations for the Administration and Congress, The Smart on Crime 
Coalition, 2011 (http://besmartoncrime.org/).  The efforts of the Smart on Crime Coalition are coordinated by the 
Constitution Project (http://constitutionproject.org/).  
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policies, exacerbating the existing problem of unequal treatment of youth of color in the justice 
system relative to their white counterparts.25  
 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, “adultification” policies have not demonstrated that they 
reduce delinquency or gang-related crime—in fact, research has shown that such policies 
actually lead to the opposite outcome, causing youth to re-offend at higher rates and enabling 
stronger gang affiliation while incarcerated.26 
 
 
Punitive Policies Increase Delinquency and Strengthen Gang Identification 
 
The “net widening” approach has swept up many youth into juvenile corrections unnecessarily, 
in that many of these young people are imprisoned for non-violent offenses.  A body of well-
established research reveals that youth who are incarcerated rather than offered community-
based alternatives do not show reductions in delinquent behavior, and in some cases are more 
likely to be rearrested than youth who avoid incarceration.27 28  For example, No Place for Kids 
reports, “Available studies of youth released from residential corrections programs find that 70 to 
80 percent of youth are rearrested within two or three years.”29  Further, a 2004 report examining 
the causes and correlates of youthful offending issued by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office 
of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention concluded that while some might argue 
suppression tactics may accomplish the immediate public safety goal of removing offenders from 
the street, there is overwhelming evidence that these punitive strategies are largely unsuccessful 
in stemming future criminal behavior.30  The report suggests that community-based sanctions 
coupled with appropriate supervision and access to services may result in a reduction in youthful 
offending.  These findings are echoed in a 2007 report from the Federal Advisory Committee on 
Juvenile Justice, which examined survey results from longitudinal studies conducted in three 
																																																								
25  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/).	
26  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008 
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/). 
	
27  The Dangers of Detention:  The Impact of Incarcerating Youth in Detention and Other Secure 
Facilities, Barry Holman and Jason Zeidenberg, Justice Policy Institute, 2006 (http://www.justicepolicy.org/ 
research/1978). 
	
28  Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice Annual Recommendations Report to the 
President and Congress of the United States, 2007 (http://www.facjj.org/annualreports/ccFACJJ%20Report% 
20508.pdf). 
	
29  No Place for Kids:  The Case for Reducing Juvenile Incarceration, The Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, 2011 (http://www.aecf.org/OurWork/JuvenileJustice/JuvenileJusticeReport.aspx). 
	
30  Thornberry, Terence P. , et al, “The Causes and Correlates Studies:  Findings and Policy 
Implications,” Juvenile Justice Journal, Volume IX, Number 1, September 2004 
(http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/203555/jj2.html). 
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U.S. cities on pathways to delinquency.  The report’s authors concluded that in responding to 
juvenile offending, “A full continuum of culturally appropriate integrated services from 
prevention through secure confinement and reentry and aftercare, provided in the least restrictive 
environment” is necessary.”31  Indeed, researchers at The National Center on Education, 
Disability, and Juvenile Justice arrived at a similar conclusion, stating:  “…data indicate that 
incarceration is a spectacularly unsuccessful treatment....”32  The growing body of research on 
this issue consistently, and increasingly, leads to the conclusion that implementation of 
sanctions-based, suppression-oriented tactics have not resulted in reductions in criminal activity 
among youthful offenders. 
 
Moreover, when evaluating the impact of punitive policies on reducing gang-related violence 
and gang affiliation, the research findings are strikingly similar.  Literature on gang membership 
among youth reveals that frequently a young person’s attachment to a “gang” can be temporary 
and transient.  Enacting harsh penalties and widening definitions of who can be deemed a “gang 
member” for prosecutorial purposes can needlessly draw youth who may not have fully 
committed to the culture of gang violence into juvenile corrections.  These juveniles may 
otherwise have corrected their behavior with the support of cost-effective programs that have 
demonstrated success.33  
 
Additional research details the failure of suppression and prosecution of gang members—as well 
as other “gang crackdown” techniques, such as those used in the 1980s and 1990s—to curb the 
prevalence of gang activity or gang violence over the last three decades.34 35  An evaluation of a 
gang suppression strategy in Los Angeles known as Operation Hardcore revealed that while the 
strategy resulted in an increase in prosecutions and arrests of gang members, it did little to stem 
gang-related violence in the areas targeted by the initiative.36  
																																																								
31  Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice Annual Recommendations Report to the 
President and Congress of the United States, 2007 (http://www.facjj.org/annualreports/ccFACJJ%20Report 
%20508.pdf). 
	
32  Leone, Peter E., et al, “School Failure, Race, and Disability:  Promoting Positive Outcomes, 
Decreasing Vulnerability for Involvement with the Juvenile Delinquency System,” National Center on Education, 
Disability, and Juvenile Justice, 2003. 
	
33  Gang Wars:  The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety 
Strategies, Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, Justice Policy Institute, 2007 (http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/ 
upload/07-07_REp_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf ). 
	
34  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/). 
 
35  Gang Wars:  The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety 
Strategies, Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, Justice Policy Institute, 2007 (http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/ 
upload/07-07_REp_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf).  
 
36  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/). 
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In addition to findings that expanded prosecutorial power and arrest of gang members have little 
effect on reducing gang activity in the community, research has further shown that such tactics 
may actually strengthen gang affiliation, especially among youth who may not have been fully 
committed to gang membership.  Scholars who have assessed gang formation theorize that by 
being publicly branded a gang member, and by spending time with more hardened gang 
members while incarcerated, youth who may have opted out of a gang can actually develop 
stronger ties to gang culture, increasing the likelihood of gang membership upon release.37 
Further, research suggests that suppression efforts have been shown to, “increase gang cohesion 
by reinforcing an ‘us versus them’ mentality, and by providing external validation of the gang’s 
importance.”38  
 
In summary, there is strong and convincing evidence from a range of disciplines over years of 
research that illustrates the ineffective and in many cases damaging and counter-productive 
impact of a “tough on crime” approach to reducing delinquency and gang-related violence. As 
the next section will detail, these policies are not only unsuccessful, but also enormously costly.  
 
 
Punitive Policies Are Not Cost-Effective 
 
A wealth of cost-benefit analyses show that investments in alternatives to incarceration—
primarily community-based sanctions and programming—are far more cost effective and 
successful at reducing delinquency than incarceration.39  Some scholars have suggested that the 
government would be wise to dedicate federal crime prevention dollars more toward community-
based sanctions and proven programs that target skill building for juvenile offenders rather than 
continue to support strategies that emphasize harsher penalties and incarceration.40  
 
The report Smart on Crime:  Recommendations for the Administration and Congress canvassed 
research on “tough on crime” policies from a wide range of disciplines, including economics, 
																																																								
37  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/).  
	
38  Gang Wars:  The Failure of Enforcement Tactics and the Need for Effective Public Safety 
Strategies, Judith Greene and Kevin Pranis, Justice Policy Institute, 2007 (http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/ 
upload/07-07_REp_GangWars_GC-PS-AC-JJ.pdf).  
	
39  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008 
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/) and Piquero, Alex and 
Steinberg, Laurence, Models for Change, Systems Reform In Juvenile Justice, Rehabilitation Versus Incarceration of 
Juvenile Offenders:  Public Preferences in Four Models for Change States, 2007 (http://www.modelsforchange.net/ 
publications/186).  
 
40  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/). 
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developmental psychology, and public health.  The report found that “public dollars spent on 
effective prevention and education programs are far more effective at reducing crime than 
broadening prosecutorial powers or stiffening criminal penalties for young people.”41  The 
financial benefit achieved by prioritizing rehabilitation in a community-based setting over 
incarceration has garnered support from surprising voices in the “rehabilitation versus 
incarceration” debate.  Historically, conservatives have been the strongest advocates for “tough 
on crime” policies regardless of the fiscal impact or consequences of an increased reliance on 
corrections.  However, the self-described “conservative case for reform” website Right on Crime 
breaks from the “tough on crime” position and concludes that investing in programs that save 
taxpayer dollars and avert future delinquency is “a positive moral outcome….”42   
 
While recognizing that alternatives to incarceration necessitate significant investments, a report 
from the Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School points 
to research from economist James Heckman.  Heckman asserts that these investments pay off in 
the long run through their enormous social benefits to the community:  savings to taxpayers 
(incarceration, averted medical costs, and costs saved as a result of redirecting individuals away 
from social welfare programs); averted violence; and, the redirection of youth away from gang 
life toward healthy alternatives.43 44 
 
Presuming that lawmakers act on behalf of their constituents’ demands, one might assume that 
the public generally supports policies that favor incarceration over rehabilitation.  However, 
there is evidence to the contrary.  Looking at four Models for Change45 states (Illinois, 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Washington), researchers examined public sentiment on policy 
preference and discovered that overall taxpayers view investing in rehabilitation far more 
favorably than investing in prosecution and incarceration of juvenile offenders.46  The authors of 
the survey concluded:  “More respondents are willing to pay for additional rehabilitation than for 
																																																								
41  Smart on Crime:  Recommendations for the Administration and Congress, The Smart on Crime 
Coalition, 2011 (http://besmartoncrime.org/).  The efforts of the Smart on Crime Coalition are coordinated by the 
Constitution Project (http://constitutionproject.org/). 
 
42  Right on Crime website (http://www.rightoncrime.com/priority-issues/juvenile-justice/).	
43  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/). 	
	
44  Heckman, James and Masterov, Dimitri, The Productivity Argument for Investing in Young 
Children, 2004 (http://www.ced.org/docs/summary/summary_heckman.pdf). 
	
45  “Models for Change supports a network of government and court officials, legal advocates, 
educators, community leaders, and families working together to ensure that kids who make mistakes are held 
accountable and treated fairly throughout the juvenile justice process.  We provide research-based tools and 
techniques to make juvenile justice more fair, effective, rational and developmentally-appropriate,” 
(http://www.modelsforchange.net/index.html). 
	
46  Piquero, Alex and Steinberg, Laurence, Rehabilitation Versus Incarceration of Juvenile 
Offenders:  Public Preferences in Four Models for Change States, Models for Change, Systems Reform In Juvenile 
Justice, 2007 (http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/186). 
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additional punishment, and the average amount in additional annual taxes that respondents are 
willing to pay for rehabilitation is almost 20% greater than it is for incarceration ($98.49 versus 
$84.52).”47  Such findings comport with the results of other public opinion polls that show that 
the public favors rehabilitation over incarceration for youth and juvenile offenders.  These public 
opinion results are heartening in that they appear to align with what research suggests. 
Additionally, they offer legislators feedback regarding constituent preference for shifting funding 
priorities toward approaches that focus more on intervention and prevention.  
 
 
National and Statewide Initiatives Shift from Punishment to Prevention 
 
There is a growing consensus that it is not fiscally responsible, nor is it sound policy practice, for 
communities to try to arrest their way out of youth and gang violence.  The arguments in support 
of prevention efforts have gathered momentum, and this shift away from punishment is reflected 
in federal and state efforts targeted at reducing such violence.  
 
 
Federal Initiatives 
 
“Youth PROMISE Act” 
 
One example of how the wealth of research related to prioritizing rehabilitation over 
incarceration has led to proposed policy changes can be seen in the Youth PROMISE Act, 
federal legislation first introduced by Representative Robert “Bobby” Scott (D-VA) in 2009.48  
The Youth PROMISE Act stands for Youth Prison Reduction through Opportunities, Mentoring, 
Intervention, Support and Education, and seeks to institute a number of measures aimed at 
curbing “youth violence, gang crime, and juvenile incarceration by promoting a more holistic 
form of juvenile justice that targets high-risk youth and tries to offer real alternatives to 
incarceration.”49  Specifically, the Act would empower local jurisdictions to invest in the 
implementation of evidence-based programs that offer intervention, prevention, and treatment 
services to at-risk and justice-involved juveniles and young adults. The Act calls for the 
coordination of local stakeholders involved in youth welfare to “assist the [federal] Office of 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) in:  (1) assessing and developing standards 
and evidence‐based practices to prevent juvenile delinquency and criminal street gang activity; 
																																																								
47  Piquero, Alex and Steinberg, Laurence, Rehabilitation Versus Incarceration of Juvenile 
Offenders:  Public Preferences in Four Models for Change States, Models for Change, Systems Reform In Juvenile 
Justice, 2007 (http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/186).	
 
48  See H.R. 1064, 111th Cong. (2009), S. 435, 111th Cong. (2009). 
	
49  “The Youth PROMISE Act:  A brief overview,” The Cochrane Collaboration College for Policy at 
George Mason University (http://s3.amazonaws.com/chssweb/documents/8202/original/YPA_brief_and_key_ 
points_v2.pdf?1331066102). 
	
	 23
and (2) collecting data in designated geographic areas to assess the needs and existing resources 
for juvenile delinquency and criminal street gang activity prevention and intervention.”50   
 
Notably, the legislation takes into account the research findings discussed earlier in this section.  
And while the scope of its reforms would apply to the nation, lawmakers and advocates in 
California played a key role in developing the content of the bill.  Representative Scott met with 
advocates and local government officials in Los Angeles and San Francisco—two of what would 
ultimately become numerous cities that have passed resolutions in support of the legislation. 
According to Bobby Vassar, Minority Chief Counsel, U.S. House Committee on the Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security and legislative aide to 
Representative Scott, California was “pivotal” in demonstrating early support for the bill.  Vassar 
noted that the endorsement by the Los Angeles City Council was particularly crucial, stating that 
“when the gang capital of the country adopts your strategy, you know you’re on the right path.”51 
 
In addition to Los Angeles and San Francisco, cities and counties across the country that have 
endorsed the legislation include:  Pasadena, California; Santa Fe County, New Mexico; New 
York, New York; East Cleveland, Ohio; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Norfolk, Virginia; Newport 
News, Virginia; and, Hampton, Virginia.  In addition, a coalition of more than 250 national, 
state, and local organizations has voiced support for the Act.  At the end of the 111th Congress, 
the bill had 235 co-sponsors in the House (including 19 Republicans).  Companion legislation in 
the Senate had 15 co-sponsors.52 53  
 
 
Other Federal Initiatives 
 
Other federal initiatives such as the Community-Based Violence Prevention Demonstration 
Program (CBVP) of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention, and the White House-led National Forum on Youth Violence Prevention are playing 
out at the state level in California.  Through the CBVP program, funds were awarded to the city 
of Oakland to put in place a multi-disciplinary violence reduction strategy that involves the 
coordinated efforts of local agencies and community groups to implement evidence-based 
practices.  The website from the national evaluators of the CBVP program states that the strategy 
that underlies the program focuses on “…deterring violent behavior by working directly with 
high-risk youth and gang offenders, by setting clear standards for their behavior, and by 
																																																								
50  “The Youth PROMISE Act:  A brief overview,” The Cochrane Collaboration College for Policy at 
George Mason University (http://s3.amazonaws.com/chssweb/documents/8202/original/YPA_brief_and_key_ 
points_v2.pdf?1331066102).   
 
51  Telephone interview with Bobby Vassar, conducted on October 19, 2012. 
	
52  The Act was introduced in the Senate by Senators Robert Casey (D-PA) and  
Olympia Snowe (R-ME). 
	
53  See http://www.bobbyscott.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id 
=291&Itemid=111. 
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providing appropriate pro-social opportunities for youth in the neighborhoods affected by 
violence.”54 
 
Oakland has established a strong street outreach effort that works with the Oakland Police 
Department and many community-based organizations to address violence and gang activity 
among youth and young adults. 
 
The California cities of San Jose and Salinas are two of 10 cities that were selected to participate 
in the Forum on Youth Violence Prevention.55 The Forum was spearheaded by the Obama 
administration and, in partnership with multiple federal agencies, the effort aims to start a 
national conversation about youth violence and gang-related crime affecting the nation’s youth.56  
The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California describes the goal of the 
Forum:  “The administration created the Forum as a context for participating localities to share 
challenges and promising strategies with each other and to explore how federal agencies can 
better support local efforts.”57  Similar to the CBVP, the Forum hopes to achieve these goals 
through the collaboration of numerous government agencies, corporate partners, non-profit 
groups, and community and faith-based organizations. 
 
 
At the Local Level 
 
As further evidence of the increasing acceptance of prevention over punishment in youth 
violence prevention, the city of Los Angeles took steps to extend summer employment 
opportunities for youth listed on gang databases and gang injunctions.  Recognizing that justice-
involved youth would benefit from increased access to employment, in 2010 the Mayor’s Office 
of Gang Reduction and Youth Development eliminated language from the application for the 
city’s summer youth jobs program that had previously excluded them.  Moreover, a proposed 
$1.4 million cut by the Los Angeles City Council to the city’s total budget of $24 million for 
gang prevention and intervention programming was scuttled.58  
																																																								
54  The national evaluators of the CBVP program are Dr. Jeffrey Butts of The City University of New 
York’s John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Research and Evaluation Center, and Dr. Caterina Roman of Temple 
University.  Additional information on the evaluation can be accessed online at http://johnjayresearch.org/rec 
/projects/cbvp/. 
 
55  The other Forum cities include:  Detroit, Boston, Chicago, and Memphis.  The Forum was recently 
expanded on September 19, 2012, to include four additional cities:  New Orleans, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, and 
Camden, N.J. 
	
56  See National Forum on Youth Violence (http://www.findyouthinfo.gov/youth-topics/preventing-
youth-violence) and Department of Justice Press Release (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/September/12-ag-
1135.html).  
	
57  The Northern District of California, Office of the Attorney General’s website on the National 
Forum on Youth Violence (http://www.justice.gov/usao/can/programs/nationalforum.html). 
	
58  “California—Los Angeles Removes Obstructions to Summer Employment Opportunities for 
Youth on Gang Databases; Proposed Cuts to Gang Prevention Programs Quashed,” Advances in Juvenile Justice 
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These efforts offer examples of the progress that has been made in terms of national policy to 
shift funding priorities behind prevention strategies, and support local jurisdictions in developing 
cross-agency and community partnerships to better serve at-risk and justice-involved youth and 
young adults.  
 
What Works in Juvenile Violence Prevention? 
A substantial and expanding collection of academic literature points to the effectiveness of 
community-based alternatives to incarceration in stemming juvenile delinquency and gang 
involvement.  Scholars are in agreement that programs with demonstrated success in offering 
critical “pro-social” skills, mental health resources, and opportunities for academic engagement 
are strongly associated with reducing juvenile delinquency—and are likely to offer alternative 
paths for those youth most susceptible to gang involvement.   
Turning attention to the programs themselves, there are a number of resources for determining 
characteristics for successful intervention and prevention.  Because the needs of individual youth 
and juveniles are varied, so too are programmatic options.  Drawing on evaluations conducted on 
promising and successful community-based alternatives, there are a number of key 
characteristics that all programs regardless of focus, should strive to incorporate.   The Charles 
Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School report isolates three 
critical factors that interventions working to stem delinquency should contain.59  Excerpted from 
their report,60 these factors include: 
(1) Programs that are successful in reducing criminal involvement among low-income 
boys in particular begin in pre-school and are sustained over time, through middle and 
high school. 
(2) Successful programs include families, schools and communities, thereby providing a 
“web” of support and protection around children. 
(3) Successful programs focus both on individual development and on teaching children 
the social and cultural skills they need to successfully navigate within their schools and 
communities. 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Reform:  Gangs, 2010, National Juvenile Justice Network (http://www.njjn.org/our-work/juvenile-justice-reform-
advances-gangs). 
	
59  The report references a number of studies in recent years from an array of disciplines including:  
the American Psychological Association; the Washington State Institute for Public Policy; the Social Development 
Research Group of Seattle, Washington; and, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention.  No More Children Left Behind Bars:  A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile 
Crime Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008 
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/Publications/Item.aspx?id=100012). 
	
60  No More Children Left Behind Bars: A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime 
Prevention, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice, Harvard Law School, 2008  
(http://www.charleshamiltonhouston.org/2008/03/no-more-children-left-behind-bars/). 
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These programs, if effectively implemented, are able to redirect the lives of at-risk youth and 
young adults—away from gangs and toward academic success and healthier lifestyles.   
 
Examples of Successful Programs in Three California Cities 
While all too often media coverage remains driven by an “if it bleeds, it leads” mentality that has 
little time for, nor interest in, day-in and day-out community-based efforts to reduce youth 
violence, there are a number of organizations that operate promising and successful prevention 
and intervention programs. This section highlights three local California efforts from Salinas, 
Oakland, and Los Angeles, describes their programmatic components, and offers a review of 
their challenges and successes.   
 
Second Chance Family and Youth Services, Salinas, California61 
“Crime pays for prison construction and guards. Without rehabilitation, they will just 
learn how to be a better criminal.” 
Program Description  In 1989, Brian Contreras and a group of community members in Salinas, 
California, began a small-scale street outreach program to try to address the widespread issue of 
youth and gang violence that threatened to devastate their neighborhood.  Their efforts gathered 
steam, and with the support of local grants and private donations, the group was able to expand 
its work and increase community partnerships. As the program evolved, it took the name Second 
Chance Family and Youth Services (Second Chance). According to Contreras, the program 
currently operates through three principal channels:  providing street outreach and reducing 
retaliations; working with community-based partners and law enforcement; and, facilitating a 
curriculum that focuses on a “healing-based” approach.62  The staff is bilingual and bicultural 
and is comprised of individuals who have had first-hand experience with gang culture and 
incarceration as well as those who have not.  Staff receive training in the areas of adolescent 
development, substance and alcohol abuse, grief counseling, and current gang intervention 
practices to ensure that they are able to provide the most appropriate services to their clients.  
What Makes it Successful?  One of the key ingredients to the success that Second Chance has 
had in working with youth and young adults is that the organization actively recruits former gang 
members to work with clients.  As someone who was once incarcerated himself, Contreras 
credits these individuals with having unique skills and perspective on the issues youth and young 
adults experience.  Contreras also points to their use of a curriculum that incorporates a “healing-
based” approach as another cornerstone of their success.  This curriculum allows youth and 
young adults to help uncover the underlying pain and adversity that the majority of their clients 
has experienced.  It also introduces participants to new definitions of what it means to be a 
“warrior”—encouraging clients to shift from the perspective that a warrior “plant seeds” (fathers 
children with multiple partners) and uses weapons to resolve disputes to the position that a 
warrior “protects his village” (community), respects women, and fulfills the duty of fatherhood.  
																																																								
61  See Second Chance Family and Youth Services at http://www.scyp.org/. 
	
62		 Telephone interview with Brian Contreras conducted on October 19, 2012.	
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Contreras feels strongly that the punitive approach to gang and youth violence is not an 
appropriate response.  Drawing on his own experience with incarceration, he says he “took what 
he learned in prison, and brought that out—what not to do” to help prevent others from making 
the same mistakes. He supports the idea of investing “upstream, rather than downstream” and 
making sure that rehabilitation and other services are available in both prison-based and 
community-based settings.  In summarizing his thoughts, Contreras notes, “Crime pays for 
prison construction and guards. Without rehabilitation, they will just learn how to be a better 
criminal.”  
The availability of programs and resources are critical in communities where violence is 
concentrated, however it is crucial that the residents feel some connection to the organizations 
offering the services. Contreras believes that active participation from community members, 
such as the former gang members that Second Chance employs and trains to work with youth 
and young adults, are key to successful outcomes. Contreras notes, “I can drive a bus full of 
programs in, but if the residents don’t own it, nothing will change.”  Reaching this population 
can be a challenge, and Contreras offers that there are windows of heightened receptivity for 
intervention such as the period immediately following a shooting or death of a close friend or 
family member.  At these times his staff is able to offer support, grief counseling, and connect 
individuals with services, adding “the sooner the better.” 
In looking to the future of his organization and the work they do, Contreras discusses two issues 
that would allow Second Chance to improve their services.  The first relates to his wish that more 
foundations would follow the lead of The California Wellness Foundation (TCWF) and The 
California Endowment by offering more funding for core support and for longer periods of time. 
Typical grants last one to two years—Contreras says that he would like to see grants that run 
closer to three to five years so that initiatives have the opportunity to become fully operational 
before they need to seek additional funds.  His second hope is that the wealth of research 
regarding harmful punitive juvenile corrections legislation will prevail, and that the portions of 
California’s Proposition 21, passed in 2000, that increase juvenile penalties will be overturned.63  
In his words, “Proposition 21 does nothing but waste more lives.”  
 
 
 
																																																								
63  From a summary of the legislative changes enacted through Proposition 21, prepared by the 
California Legislative Analyst’s Office:  “This measure makes various changes to laws specifically related to the 
treatment of juvenile offenders.  In addition, it changes laws for juveniles and adults who are gang-related offenders, 
and those who commit violent and serious crimes.  Specifically, it:  requires more juvenile offenders to be tried in 
adult court; requires that certain juvenile offenders be held in local or state correctional facilities; changes the types 
of probation available for juvenile felons; reduces confidentiality protections for juvenile offenders; increases 
penalties for gang-related crimes and requires convicted gang members to register with local law enforcement 
agencies; and, increases criminal penalties for certain serious and violent offenses 
(http://www.lao.ca.gov/ballot/2000/21_03_2000.html). 
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 Youth Alive!, Oakland, California64 
“You can’t arrest someone out of emotional anger.” 
Program Description  Based in Oakland, California, Youth Alive! was founded in 1991. The 
organization operates three initiatives that, individually and collectively, aim to reduce youth 
violence and gang activity.  The three programs are “Teens on Target,” “Caught in the 
Crossfire,” and, the “Khadafy Washington Project.”  
 
“Teens on Target” (TNT) recruits young people from neighborhoods most affected by violence 
to become leaders in the violence prevention movement.  Training them to become Peer 
Educators, they work with community leaders and engage middle and high school students by 
facilitating violence-reduction workshops.  “Caught in the Crossfire” employs young adults who 
have prevailed over their own history of violence to offer intervention services to youth 
recovering in a hospital setting from violent injuries.  These “intervention specialists” are trained 
to provide sustained case management, referrals to community resources, mentoring, and home 
visits to youth in an effort to help them recover from injuries, and reduce retaliation, re-injury, 
and arrest.  “Caught in the Crossfire” was the first hospital-based intervention program in the 
country, and its success has resulted in the founding of the National Network of Hospital-based 
Violence Intervention Programs.65 The “Khadafy Washington Project”66 works to provide 
guidance and counseling to the family and friends of homicide victims by:  calming tensions to 
dissuade retaliatory violence; offering emotional support and guidance immediately after a 
traumatic event; and, assisting survivors with practical and financial assistance.67 
 
What Makes It Successful?  Executive Director Anne Marks attributes much of Youth Alive!’s 
success to the unifying principal that drives all of its programs:  the incorporation of the youth 
and young adults in leadership roles.  She asserts, “Young people aren’t the problem, they’re the 
solution. There is an enormous amount of resilience and untapped talent in these communities, 
but they haven’t had the opportunity to do anything.  When you provide the opportunity they can 
really shine.”68 The practice of recruiting young people from their own neighborhoods to carry 
the violence-reduction message has many benefits, such as involving residents in resolving 
																																																								
64  See Youth Alive! at http://www.youthalive.org/. 
	
65  From the National Network of Hospital-based Violence Intervention Programs (NNHVIP) 
website, “Violence prevention and intervention programs are a powerful way to stop the revolving door of violent 
injury in our hospitals.  Engaging patients in the hospital, during their recovery, is a golden opportunity to change 
their lives and reduce retaliation and recidivism.  The National Network of Hospital-based Violence Intervention 
Programs (NNHVIP) brings together the best and most exciting programs to share knowledge, develop best 
practices, collaborate on research, affect policy change, and more,” (http://www.youthalive.org/national-network/ 
and http://nnhvip.org/).  
	
66  “The program was named after the murdered teenage son of the program’s founder, Marilyn 
Washington Harris,” (http://www.youthalive.org/khadafy-washington-project/). 
	
67			 See http://www.youthalive.org/khadafy-washington-project/. 
	
68		 Telephone interview with Anne Marks, conducted on October 23, 2012. 
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problems that arise within their community.  This, in turn, translates to a sense of ownership 
within the community.  Further, because the message is carried by someone from the 
community, as opposed to an outsider, they understand the community dynamic.  And finally, by 
empowering youth and young adults with leadership roles, some of which are paid positions, 
Youth Alive! provides jobs and volunteer opportunities that expose youth to the field of social 
welfare.  
Marks also draws a division between the type of violence that is organized or economically 
motivated and what she sees in Oakland, which she characterizes more as crimes of opportunity, 
retaliatory in nature, and largely the result of interpersonal matters.  From this perspective, she 
sees little value in relying on the traditional strategies of suppression and punishment to combat 
community violence, noting, “You can’t arrest someone out of emotional anger.”  In her view, 
resolving high levels of community and gang violence involves efforts that span a variety of 
services, including linking youth and young adults to mental health and substance abuse 
resources, mentorship and long-term case management, and general support as they transition 
from a culture of violence to a healthier life path. Recognizing that the young people in 
Oakland’s most afflicted neighborhoods respond to the violence with the only tools they see 
around them, Marks notes, “Carrying a gun, joining a gang—these are things that feel protective, 
but aren’t. Every situation becomes potentially lethal.”  The key to changing these norms, she 
says, is to work at the individual level and bring them to the point where they’re ready to move 
their life in a different direction.  As an example of the kind of impact a one-on-one relationship 
can have on a client, a 22-year-old victim of a gunshot wound reflected on the relationship with 
his “Caught in the Crossfire” case manager, “The case manager from Youth Alive! exceeded my 
expectations.  At first I didn’t think it was going to be much, and I didn’t want to talk to someone 
about what happened. Without my case manager, I would’ve healed physically, but not 
emotionally. It’s been nearly a year and I still speak with him once a week.  He will be at my 
wedding one day.”69  
 
The Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD) Program, Los Angeles, California70 
“One of our main goals is to have tattoos see human beings behind the badge, and vice 
versa.” 
Program Description The Gang Reduction and Youth Development Program, or GRYD, 
represents a multifaceted approach to the high levels of youth and gang violence in Los Angeles.  
GRYD is managed through the Los Angeles Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa’s Office of Gang 
Reduction and Youth Development by Deputy Mayor Guillermo Cespedes, who is the main 
architect behind the program.  While its current structure reflects years of refinement after its 
inception in 2007, the GRYD Program involves several components, including:  the 
																																																								
69  Telephone interview with “Caught in the Crossfire” services recipient, conducted on  
October 24, 2012.  
	
70  The City of Los Angeles Mayor’s Office for Gang Reduction, GRYD 
(http://mayor.lacity.org/issues/ gangreduction/index.htm). 
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Multigenerational Family Gang Prevention program; the Gang Intervention Incident Response 
strategy; a Case Management effort; the Summer Night Lights program; and, LA VITA, the LA 
Violence Intervention Training Academy.  Together, these programs form a comprehensive 
approach to violence and gang reduction in the city of Los Angeles. Through these strategies, 
GRYD has three fundamental objectives:  to improve prevention by reaching out to at-risk youth 
and young adults; to provide intervention services to help those transitioning from gangs; and, to 
offer crisis intervention and outreach to those afflicted by the violence. While the emphasis in 
Los Angeles has shifted to prevention through the efforts of the GRYD Program, GRYD staff 
work in concert with the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and when public safety is at 
risk, the LAPD responds to those who engage in illegal activity.  Currently, the programs offered 
through GRYD exist in 12 GRYD Zones, including 24 parks, defined as areas of the city where 
violence is most highly concentrated.  
What Makes It Successful?  More than any other aspect of the GRYD Program, Deputy Mayor 
Cespedes attributes the success the city has achieved to two primary philosophical shifts.71  The 
first is a high-level change in the entire orientation toward youth and gang violence, involving a 
shift of focus away from the identity of the individual to concentrating on the behavior of the 
individual. Cespedes likens this theory of change to looking through a lens.  When the lens is 
changed from one that looks at an individual’s pathology to one that examines an individual’s 
relational networks, it is possible to change behavior by changing the relationships, such that 
whatever problems exist in the prior relationship change as well.  This approach represents a 
stark departure from the way in which young people have historically been viewed by law 
enforcement.  Historically, the very nature of contact with law enforcement rests on the 
classification of crimes and criminals, assigning labels to an individual based on his or her 
behavior. Turning this on its head, Cespedes seeks to reshape the dynamic of interaction with 
this population such that the networks of relationships are center stage. Working within these 
networks involves the comprehensive approach prescribed in GRYD, engaging the whole 
community to stem violence.  
A second and profound shift in Cespedes’ approach in Los Angeles has to do with the role of law 
enforcement. Historically, there has been an often-overlooked tension between police and the 
providers of community-based services. Because providers largely operate from a therapeutic 
orientation, and police from a public-safety perspective, the two often found themselves at odds 
when their populations overlapped.  However, under the GRYD Program, Cespedes has worked 
to reconceptualize the idea of “community stakeholder” as one that is inclusive of law 
enforcement.  He urges providers to incorporate the police in all aspects of the GRYD Program’s 
comprehensive strategy and not only during a crisis.  He summarizes this shift with language 
borrowed from law enforcement, “One of our main goals is to have tattoos see human beings 
behind the badge, and vice versa.”  It is his hope that through these efforts, law enforcement will 
be seen as an integral part of the community.  
																																																								
71  Telephone interview with Guillermo Cespedes, conducted on October 21, 2012.  See also:  
http://mayor.lacity.org/PressRoom/LACITYP_006148; http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/GangReduction /index.htm;  
http://mayor.lacity.org/Issues/GangReduction/SummerNightLights/Index.htm; and, The City of Los Angeles Mayor’s 
Office of Gang Reduction and Youth Development (GRYD):  Comprehensive Strategy, Cespedes, Guillermo, MSW 
and Herz, Denise C., Ph.D., December 2011. 
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The GRYD Program has undergone external evaluation by the Washington, D.C.-based Urban 
Institute (UI), which has found that significant progress has occurred across many of their 
programs.  In 2011, an assessment of the Intervention component revealed that the crime rate in 
Los Angeles is the lowest it has been since 1959, and that between 2007 and 2011, gang-related 
violence cumulatively decreased across all GRYD Zones. In looking at the Prevention 
component, UI discovered that nearly 50 percent of program participants reported reductions in 
risk factors and negative behavior.  The Summer Night Lights program72 experienced similar 
reductions in violent crime. Comparing data from 2007 to 2011, researchers revealed:  a 35 
percent drop for gang-related Part I crimes across all Summer Night Lights locations combined; 
a 35 percent drop in gang-related homicides; a 43 percent drop in aggravated assaults; and, a 55 
percent reduction in shots fired.  These findings represent not only that the comprehensive 
approach is producing the intended outcomes, but also that the philosophical shift in orientation 
prescribed by Cespedes has traction—both of which are measures of success. 73  
Looking to the future, Cespedes acknowledged the vast amount of work that remains to be 
accomplished, and shared an experience that pushes him toward that goal.  About a year ago, he 
had arrived on the scene of a shooting that resulted in a homicide. Roughly 20 feet from the 
yellow caution tape cordoning off the crime scene, Cespedes observed a young girl skipping 
rope.  His first thought was, “What kind of parent would allow a kid to jump rope so close to a 
crime scene?” And, then the realization hit him:  this was normal.  
 
	
																																																								
72  From Mayor Villaraigosa’s Gang Reduction website, “Summer Night Lights is an anti-gang 
initiative that keeps parks open after dark—during the peak hours for gang activity—with free food and expanded 
programming. By empowering communities and targeting the traditionally most-violent summer months, Summer 
Night Lights has become a national model for violence reduction,” (http://mayor.lacity.org/issues/gangreduction/ 
summernightlights/index.htm). 
 
73   “The UCR Program collects statistics on the number of offenses known to law enforcement.  In 
the traditional Summary Reporting System (SRS), there are eight crimes, or Part I offenses, (murder and non-
negligent homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny-theft, and 
arson) to be reported to the UCR Program,” U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform 
Crime Reports (http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/ucrdata/offenses.cfm) and “GRYD Program Milestones” information sheet.	
	
74 Federal law prohibits Federal Firearms License holders from selling handguns to anyone under the
age of 21.  California law prohibits the sale of handguns by any person or corporation to anyone under the age of 21. 
Federal and California law prohibit the possession of handguns by anyone under the age of 18 with exceptions
including hunting and competitive shooting.  For exceptions see Ca. Penal Code 12101 Sections (a)(1), (a)(2). 
(Legal Community Against Violence, California State Law Summary, http://www.lcav.org/states/
Californiadetailedsummary.pdf#page=7).
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Conclusion
Homicide, and particularly gun homicide, continues to be one of the most pressing public health
concerns in California among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24. 
Effective violence prevention strategies must include measures that prioritize preventing youth and
young adults from accessing firearms, especially handguns.  With firearms accounting for 83 percent
of homicides in the 10 to 24 age range in California and handguns accounting for 73 percent of all
gun homicides, the importance of prevention strategies to limit exposure to firearms in this age range
are of the utmost importance.  Important components of such a strategy would be the identification
of the make, model, and caliber of weapons most preferred by this age group as well as analyses
identifying the sources of the weapons.  It should be kept in mind that a large percentage of this age
group—those under the age of 21—cannot legally purchase a handgun.  It is also generally illegal
for anyone under the age of 18 to possess a handgun.74  While most youth and young adults can
neither buy nor possess a handgun, this in no way protects them from the emotional and
psychological effects of gun violence.  An ongoing need exists for the expansion of comprehensive
violence intervention and prevention strategies that include a focus on the psychological well-being
of witnesses and survivors of gun violence.
This year’s county-by-county rankings also point to the continuing urgent need for tailored, localized
approaches to reducing youth homicide that integrate prevention and intervention while engaging
local leaders and community stakeholders.  At the same time, state and regional policies should
incorporate elements necessary to help ensure effective community practices. 
Youth violence and its attendant high rates of homicide as well as gang warfare devastate many
neighborhoods, destroying countless lives.  The impact of this violence ripples across communities,
ravaging local economies, home values, and depressing business centers.   The violence forces
people inside, limiting recreation and neighbor-to-neighbor interaction, holding residents captive.
It is consuming and seemingly relentless. What is also clear is that these communities and the
residents who reside in them are suffering deeply. Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that
numerous programs—many on shoestring budgets—are capable of turning lives around and healing
communities using holistic approaches.  What might these communities look like if a substantial
percentage of corrections funds were diverted to support street outreach and mental health services?
The current “tough on crime” mentality that, despite the wealth of research, continues to exercise
control over too many policymakers is not only economically unsustainable it is also morally suspect.
It is time to allow programs such as the examples detailed in this report a real opportunity to improve
neighborhoods and change lives through a significant shift in resources, and in the way we think
about violence. 
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Appendix One:  Youth and Young Adult Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 in 
the United States by State, Ranked by Rate, 2010
State Ranking
by Rate
State Number of Homicide
Victims
Homicide Rate per
100,000
1 Louisiana 172 17.70
2 Missouri 145 11.75
3 Delaware 21 11.39
4 Illinois 294 10.97
5 Maryland 129 10.94
6 New Mexico 45 10.37
7 Alabama 100 10.02
8 Mississippi 61 9.48
9 Pennsylvania 239 9.30
10 Florida 333 9.28
11 Michigan 185 8.88
12 Georgia 179 8.61
13 Oklahoma 67 8.51
14 California 690 8.43
15 South Carolina 75 7.82
16 Tennessee 100 7.80
17 Arizona 103 7.61
18 Nevada 41 7.55
19 New York 298 7.47
20 New Jersey 128 7.41
21 North Carolina 140 7.17
22 Virginia 113 6.91
23 Massachusetts 88 6.55
24 Ohio 154 6.52
25 Texas 362 6.49
26 Connecticut 46 6.40
27 Alaska 10 6.35
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100,000
75 Beginning with 2008 data, the National Center for Health Statistics has begun suppressing data if
fewer than 10 deaths aree reported in a given state.  Death counts and rates are not included for those states.  They
are, however, included in the U.S. total for deaths and rate.
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28 Indiana 87 6.31
29 Nebraska 20 5.25
30 Arkansas 31 5.16
31 Colorado 43 4.21
32 Wisconsin 47 4.05
33 Kentucky 35 4.02
34 Washington 53 3.89
35 Kansas 23 3.79
36 West Virginia 12 3.46
37 Minnesota 33 3.07
38 Iowa 14 2.22
39 Oregon 16 2.13
Hawaii fewer than 10 deaths75 NA
Idaho fewer than 10 deaths NA
Maine fewer than 10 deaths NA
Montana fewer than 10 deaths NA
New Hampshire fewer than 10 deaths NA
North Dakota fewer than 10 deaths NA
Rhode Island fewer than 10 deaths NA
South Dakota fewer than 10 deaths NA
Utah fewer than 10 deaths NA
Vermont fewer than 10 deaths NA
Wyoming fewer than 10 deaths NA
U.S. Total 4,781 7.45
76 To help ensure more stable rates, only counties with a population of at least 25,000 youth and
young adults between the ages of 10 to 24 are included.  The selected counties account for 98 percent of homicide
victims ages 10 to 24 in California (631 out of 641 victims) and 98 percent of California’s population ages 10 to 24
(8,014,360 out of 8,188,043) for 2011. 
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Appendix Two:  Youth and Young Adult Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 in 
California by County, Ranked by Rate, 2011
County Ranking
by Rate
County Number of Homicide
Victims
Homicide Rate per
100,000
1 San Joaquin76 35 21.29
2 San Francisco 21 18.04
3 Monterey 16 16.96
4 Alameda 50 16.82
5 Contra Costa 31 14.74
6 Solano 12 13.71
7 Tulare 15 13.43
8 Stanislaus 12 9.92
9 Los Angeles 207 9.55
10 Santa Cruz 6 9.40
11 Fresno 20 8.64
12 Sacramento 26 8.48
13 Kings 3 8.42
14 San Bernadino 39 7.65
15 San Mateo 9 7.26
16 Merced 4 5.93
17 Kern 12 5.79
18 Santa Clara 19 5.54
19 Imperial 2 4.65
20 Riverside 24 4.55
21 Sonoma 4 4.24
Appendix Two:  Youth and Young Adult Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 in 
California by County, Ranked by Rate, 2011
County Ranking
by Rate
County Number of Homicide
Victims
Homicide Rate per
100,000
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22 Orange 25 3.82
23 San Diego 25 3.61
24 Butte 2 3.60
25 Yolo 2 3.19
26 Ventura 5 2.77
27 Santa Barbara 3 2.67
28 Marin 1 2.63
29 San Luis Obispo 1 1.50
30 (tie) El Dorado 0 0.00
30 (tie) Humboldt 0 0.00
30 (tie) Madera 0 0.00
30 (tie) Napa 0 0.00
30 (tie) Placer 0 0.00
30 (tie) Shasta 0 0.00
California Total 631 7.87
77 To help ensure more stable rates, only counties with a population of at least 25,000 youth and
young adults between the ages of 10 to 24 are included.  The selected counties account for 98 percent of homicide
victims ages 10 to 24 in California (631 out of 641 victims) and 98 percent of California’s population ages 10 to 24
(8,014,360 out of 8,188,043) for 2011. 
37
Appendix Three:  Youth and Young Adult Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 in 
California and Rates, Alphabetically by County, 2011
County
County
Ranking
by Rate
Number of Homicide Victims Homicide Rate per 100,000
Alameda77 4 50 16.82
Butte 24 2 3.60
Contra Costa 5 31 14.74
El Dorado 30 (tie) 0 0.00
Fresno 11 20 8.64
Humboldt 30 (tie) 0 0.00
Imperial 19 2 4.65
Kern 17 12 5.79
Kings 13 3 8.42
Los Angeles 9 207 9.55
Madera 30 (tie) 0 0.00
Marin 28 1 2.63
Merced 16 4 5.93
Monterey 3 16 16.96
Napa 30 (tie) 0 0.00
Orange 22 25 3.82
Placer 30 (tie) 0 0.00
Riverside 20 24 4.55
Sacramento 12 26 8.48
San Bernardino 14 39 7.65
San Diego 23 25 3.61
San Francisco 2 21 18.04
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County
County
Ranking
by Rate
Number of Homicide Victims Homicide Rate per 100,000
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San Joaquin 1 35 21.29
San Luis Obispo 29 1 1.50
San Mateo 15 9 7.26
Santa Barbara 27 3 2.67
Santa Clara 18 19 5.54
Santa Cruz 10 6 9.40
Shasta 30 (tie) 0 0.00
Solano 6 12 13.71
Sonoma 21 4 4.24
Stanislaus 8 12 9.92
Tulare 7 15 13.43
Ventura 26 5 2.77
Yolo 25 2 3.19
California Total 631 7.87
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Appendix Four:  Youth and Young Adult Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 in California
and Rates, Alphabetically by County, 2009 through 2011
County
County Ranking
by Rate
Number of Homicide
Victims
Homicide Rate per
100,000
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
Alameda 2 2 4 56 55 50 20.69 18.41 16.82
Butte 34 28 24 1 1 2 1.61 1.87 3.60
Contra Costa 4 6 5 40 27 31 19.17 12.94 14.74
El Dorado 29 31 (tie) 30 (tie) 1 0 0 2.83 0.00 0.00
Fresno 12 7 11 25 27 20 11.54 11.61 8.64
Humboldt 19 31 (tie) 30 (tie) 2 0 0 6.23 0.00 0.00
Imperial 31 26 19 1 1 2 2.56 2.33 4.65
Kern 3 11 17 39 23 12 19.98 11.12 5.79
Kings 14 25 13 4 1 3 11.06 2.79 8.42
Los Angeles 6 10 9 303 248 207 14.61 11.35 9.55
Madera 20 9 30 (tie) 2 4 0 6.01 11.39 0.00
Marin 32 20 28 1 2 1 2.50 5.35 2.63
Merced 9 5 16 8 9 4 12.87 13.44 5.93
Monterey 1 1 3 28 23 16 31.24 24.36 16.96
Napa 35 31 (tie) 30 (tie) 0 0 0 0.00 0.00 0.00
Orange 26 23 22 25 22 25 4.10 3.37 3.82
Placer 24 31 (tie) 30 (tie) 3 0 0 4.48 0.00 0.00
Riverside 21 18 (tie) 20 28 30 24 5.71 5.75 4.55
Sacramento 13 13 12 33 30 26 11.39 9.75 8.48
San Bernardino 16 16 14 42 34 39 8.29 6.67 7.65
San Diego 27 22 23 26 26 25 4.03 3.73 3.61
San Francisco 11 8 2 12 14 21 11.84 11.52 18.04
San Joaquin 7 3 1 22 30 35 13.86 18.36 21.29
San Luis Obispo 22 24 29 4 2 1 5.62 3.16 1.50
Appendix Four:  Youth and Young Adult Homicide Victims Ages 10 to 24 in California
and Rates, Alphabetically by County, 2009 through 2011
County
County Ranking
by Rate
Number of Homicide
Victims
Homicide Rate per
100,000
2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011 2009 2010 2011
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San Mateo 17 15 15 9 9 9 7.39 7.26 7.26
Santa Barbara 25 30 27 5 1 3 4.46 0.93 2.67
Santa Clara 23 27 18 18 7 19 5.49 2.05 5.54
Santa Cruz 15 14 10 6 6 6 9.45 9.73 9.40
Shasta 30 18 (tie) 30 (tie) 1 2 0 2.72 5.75 0.00
Solano 10 12 6 11 9 12 12.59 10.24 13.71
Sonoma 33 31 (tie) 21 2 0 4 2.20 0.00 4.24
Stanislaus 8 17 8 16 7 12 13.49 5.78 9.92
Tulare 5 4 7 16 20 15 15.31 18.06 13.43
Ventura 18 21 26 11 9 5 6.38 4.96 2.77
Yolo 28 29 25 2 1 2 3.13 1.69 3.19
California Total 803 680 631 10.48 8.48 7.87
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Appendix Five:
Additional Information for the 10 Counties with the
Highest Rates of Youth and Young Adult 
Homicide Victimization 
78 To help ensure more stable rates, only counties with a population of at least 25,000 youth and
young adults between the ages of 10 to 24 are included.  The selected counties account for 98 percent of homicide
victims ages 10 to 24 in California (631 out of 641 victims) and 98 percent of California’s population ages 10 to 24
(8,014,360 out of 8,188,043) for 2011. 
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California
631 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in California in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in California
was 7.87 per 100,000 in 201178
Gender
Out of 631 homicide victims, 577 were male (91 percent), and 54 were female (9 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 629 homicide victims, 343 were Hispanic (55 percent), 201 were black (32 percent), 51 were
white (8 percent), 32 were Asian (5 percent), and 2 were “other” (less than 1 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 83 percent of victims (520 out of 625)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 73 percent (382 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
were 70 victims (11 percent) killed with knives or other cutting instruments, 11 victims (2 percent)
killed by a blunt object, and 8 victims (1 percent) killed by bodily force.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 31 percent of victims
(97 out of 316) were murdered by someone they knew.  One hundred seventy-two victims were
killed by strangers.  For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified,
15 percent (47 out of 316) were gang members. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 81 percent (362 out of 445) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 61 percent (222 homicides) were gang-
related.  Twenty-two percent (80 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the
offender.  Eleven percent (40 homicides) were drive-by shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 55 percent (344 out of 620) occurred on
a street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Twelve percent (75 out of 620) occurred in the home of the
victim or offender.  Thirteen percent (82 out of 620) occurred at another residence, and 6 percent (40
out of 620) occurred in a vehicle.
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San Joaquin County
35 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in San Joaquin County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in San Joaquin County 
was 21.29 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 1st in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 35 homicide victims, 32 were male (91 percent), and 3 were female (9 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 35 homicide victims, 18 were Hispanic (51 percent), 9 were black (26 percent), 2 were white
(6 percent), and 6 were Asian (17 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 94 percent of victims (33 out of 35)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 85 percent (28 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
was 1 victim (3 percent) killed with a knife or other cutting instrument.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 35 percent of victims
(6 out of 17) were murdered by someone they knew.  Ten victims were killed by strangers.  For
homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 6 percent (1 out of 17)
were gang members. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 67 percent (14 out of 21) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 29 percent (4 homicides) were gang-related.
Twenty-one percent (3 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the offender.  Fifty
percent (7 homicides) were drive-by shootings. 
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 46 percent (16 out of 35) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Six percent (2 out of 35) occurred in the home of the victim or
offender.  Twenty percent (7 out of 35) occurred at another residence, and 14 percent (5 out of 35)
occurred in a vehicle.
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San Francisco County
21 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in San Francisco County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in San Francisco County 
was 18.04 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 2nd in California among counties with a population of
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater 
Gender
Out of 21 homicide victims, 21 were male (100 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 21 homicide victims, 4 were Hispanic (19 percent), 13 were black (62 percent), 1 was white
(5 percent), and 3 were Asian (14 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 90 percent of victims (19 out of 21)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 95 percent (18 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
was 1 victim (5 percent) killed with a knife or other cutting instrument.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 50 percent of victims
(6 out of 12) were murdered by someone they knew.  Two victims were killed by strangers.  For
homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 33 percent (4 out of 12)
were gang members.  
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 80 percent (8 out of 10) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 50 percent (4 homicides) were gang-related.
Thirty-eight percent (3 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the offender.
Thirteen percent (1 homicide) were drive-by shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 76 percent (16 out of 21) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Ten percent (2 out of 21) occurred in the home of the victim or
offender.  Five percent (1 out of 21) occurred in a vehicle.
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Monterey County
16 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Monterey County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Monterey County 
was 16.96 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 3rd in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 16 homicide victims, 14 were male (88 percent), and 2 were female (13 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 16 homicide victims, 14 were Hispanic (88 percent) and 2 were white (13 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 93 percent of victims (14 out of 15)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 43 percent (6 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
was 1 victim (7 percent) killed with a knife or other cutting instrument.   
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 40 percent of victims
(2 out of 5) were murdered by someone they knew.  Two victims were killed by strangers.  For
homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 20 percent (1 out of 5)
were gang members. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 92 percent (11 out of 12) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 82 percent (9 homicides) were gang-related.
Nine percent (1 homicide) involved arguments between the victim and the offender. 
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 33 percent (5 out of 15) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Seven percent (1 out of 15) occurred in the home of the victim
or offender.  Thirty-three percent (5 out of 15) occurred at another residence, and 7 percent (1 out
of 15) occurred in a vehicle.
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Alameda County
50 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Alameda County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Alameda County 
was 16.82 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 4th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 50 homicide victims, 46 were male (92 percent), and 4 were female (8 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 50 homicide victims, 2 were Hispanic (4 percent), 39 were black (78 percent), 8 were white
(16 percent), and 1 was Asian (2 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 96 percent of victims (48 out of 50)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 42 percent (20 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
was 1 victim (2 percent) killed with a knife or other cutting instrument, and 1 victim (2 percent)
killed with a blunt object.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 10 percent of victims
(1 out of 10) were murdered by someone they knew.  Eight victims were killed by strangers.  For
homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 10 percent (1 out of 10)
were gang members.  
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 46 percent (6 out of 13) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 50 percent (3 homicides) were gang-related.
Fifty percent (3 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the offender. 
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 75 percent (36 out of 48) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Four percent (2 out of 48) occurred in the home of the victim
or offender.  Six percent (3 out of 48) occurred at another residence.
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Contra Costa County
31 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Contra Costa County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Contra Costa County 
was 14.74 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 5th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 31 homicide victims, 30 were male (97 percent), and 1 was female (3 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 31 homicide victims, 8 were Hispanic (26 percent), 18 were black (58 percent), and 5 were
white (16 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 94 percent of victims (29 out of 31)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 69 percent (20 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
were 2 victims (6 percent) killed with knives or other cutting instruments.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 44 percent of victims
(4 out of 9) were murdered by someone they knew.  Four were killed by strangers.  For homicides
in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 11 percent (1 out of 9) were gang
members. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 88 percent (15 out of 17) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 13 percent (2 homicides) were gang-related.
Thirty-three percent (5 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the offender.  Forty-
seven percent (7 homicides) were drive-by shootings. 
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 47 percent (14 out of 30) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Twenty percent (6 out of 30) occurred in the home of the victim
or offender.  Ten percent (3 out of 30) occurred at another residence.  Thirteen percent (4 homicides)
occurred in a vehicle.
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Solano County
12 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Solano County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Solano County 
was 13.71 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 6th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 12 homicide victims, 12 were male (100 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 12 homicide victims, 5 were Hispanic (42 percent), and 7 were black (58 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 92 percent of victims (11 out of 12)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 91 percent (10 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
was 1 victim (8 percent) killed with a knife or other cutting instrument.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 60 percent of victims
(3 out of 5) were murdered by someone they knew.  One victim was killed by a stranger.  For
homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 20 percent (1 out of 5)
were gang members.  
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 60 percent (3 out of 5) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Sixty-seven percent (2 homicides) involved
arguments between the victim and the offender.  Thirty-three percent (1 homicide) were drive-by
shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 36 percent (4 out of 11) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Nine percent (1 out of 11) occurred in the home of the victim
or offender.  Eighteen percent (2 out of 11) occurred at another residence, and 27 percent (3 out of
11) occurred in a vehicle.
49
Tulare County
15 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Tulare County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Tulare County 
was 13.43 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 7th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 15 homicide victims, 15 were male (100 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 15 homicide victims, 14 were Hispanic (93 percent), and 1 was black (7 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 73 percent of victims (11 out of 15)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 73 percent (8 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
were 3 victims (20 percent) killed with knives or other cutting instruments.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 10 percent of victims
(1 out of 10) were murdered by someone they knew.  Four victims were killed by strangers.  For
homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 50 percent (5 out of 10)
were gang members. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 92 percent (12 out of 13) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 75 percent (9 homicides) were gang-related.
Seventeen percent (2 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the offender.  Eight
percent (1 homicide) were drive-by shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 67 percent (10 out of 15) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Thirteen percent (2 out of 15) occurred in the home of the victim
or offender.  Seven percent (1 out of 15) occurred at another residence.
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Stanislaus County
12 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Stanislaus County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Stanislaus County 
was 9.92 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 8th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 12 homicide victims, 11 were male (92 percent), and 1 was female (8 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 12 homicide victims, 9 were Hispanic (75 percent), 1 was black (8 percent), and 2 were white
(17 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 67 percent of victims (8 out of 12) were
shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 50 percent (4 victims) were killed with handguns.  There were
4 victims (33 percent) killed with knives or other cutting instruments.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, no victims were
murdered by someone they knew.  Five victims were killed by strangers.  For homicides in which
the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 38 percent (3 out of 8) were gang members.
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 100 percent (10 out of 10) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 40 percent (4 homicides) were gang-related.
Fifty percent (5 homicides) involved an argument between the victim and the offender.  Ten percent
(1 homicide) were drive-by shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 25 percent (3 out of 12) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Thirty-three percent (4 out of 12) occurred at another residence,
and 17 percent (2 out of 12) occurred in a vehicle.
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Los Angeles County
207 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Los Angeles County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Los Angeles County 
was 9.55 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 9th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 207 homicide victims, 191 were male (92 percent), and 16 were female (8 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 206 homicide victims, 135 were Hispanic (66 percent), 63 were black (31 percent), 5 were
white (2 percent), 2 were Asian (1 percent), and 1 was “other” (less than 1 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 87 percent of victims (178 out of 205)
were shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 88 percent (157 victims) were killed with handguns.  There
were 18 victims (9 percent) killed with knives or other cutting instruments, and 4 victims (2 percent)
killed by a blunt object.  
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 12 percent of victims
(11 out of 92) were murdered by someone they knew.  Seventy-one victims were killed by strangers.
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, 11 percent (10 out
of 92) were gang members. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 86 percent (142 out of 166) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 75 percent (107 homicides) were gang-
related.  Thirteen percent (19 homicides) involved arguments between the victim and the offender.
Eight percent (12 homicides) were drive-by shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 64 percent (130 out of 202) occurred on
a street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot.  Ten percent (20 out of 202) occurred in the home of the victim
or offender.  Ten percent (21 out of 202) occurred at another residence, and 6 percent (13 out of 202)
occurred in a vehicle.
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Santa Cruz County
6 youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 were murdered in Santa Cruz County in 2011
The homicide rate among youth and young adults ages 10 to 24 in Santa Cruz County 
was 9.40 per 100,000 in 2011
Ranked 10th in California among counties with a population of 
10- to 24-year olds 25,000 or greater
Gender
Out of 6 homicide victims, 6 were male (100 percent). 
Race/Ethnicity
Out of 6 homicide victims, 6 were Hispanic (100 percent).
Most Common Weapons
For homicides in which the weapon used could be identified, 100 percent of victims (6 out of 6) were
shot and killed with guns.  Of these, 67 percent (4 victims) were killed with handguns. 
Victim to Offender Relationship
For homicides in which the victim to offender relationship could be identified, no victims were
murdered by someone they knew.  Two victims were killed by strangers. 
Circumstance
For homicides in which the circumstances could be identified, 83 percent (5 out of 6) were not
related to the commission of any other felony.  Of these, 80 percent (4 homicides) were gang-related.
Twenty percent (1 homicide) were drive-by shootings.
Location
For homicides in which the location could be determined, 67 percent (4 out of 6) occurred on a
street, sidewalk, or in a parking lot. 
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